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ASSIGNMENTS FOR SECURITY AND FEDERAL
TAX LIENS
JOHN I. CREEDON*
i. INTRODUCTION
S OPHISTICATED financial transactions often assume a form in which
the high credit corporation, on which the lender depends for repay-
ment of its loan, is not the borrower. Instead, the credit of the corpora-
tion is literally and legally secured by way of an assignment of a lease,
charter or other contract under which the high credit corporation is
obligated to make payments as lessee, charterer or contract party. As the
foregoing suggests, the property financed may range from immovable
real estate to a highly mobile ship. In between, property as varied as oil
and gas pipelines, coal mines, iron ore, limestone, phosphate, pulp and
newsprint has been the subject of these financings. In addition to the
garden variety lease and charter, the contracts have received such varie-
gated designations as "take or pay contracts," "take or lend contracts,"
"thru-put agreements," "supply contracts" and "output agreements."
Despite the trappings, the essence is an agreement by the high credit
corporation to make periodic payments that are sufficient to repay the
principal of the borrower's loan with interest.'
Financing transactions assume these forms for a variety of reasons.
In some, and perhaps most instances, tax considerations are a factor.2
Accounting considerations may also influence the high credit corpora-
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, New York University and Trustee of the Practising
Law Institute. The author acknowledges with thanks the substantial research assistance of
Stephen R. LaSala, a member of the Fordham Law Review.
1. See, e.g., Anderson, The Mortgagee Looks at the Commercial Lease, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev.
484 (1957); Bernard, Function & Role of the Owner's Lawyer, 20 Bus. Law. 114 (1964);
Clark, The Lease, The Assignment & The Parties in 1007 Financing of Newly 'Improved
Realty, 18 Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel 415 (1964); Gustin, Financing by Contract & by Lease
-Some Considerations, 13 Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel 685 (1957); Hyde, The Real Estate
Lease as a Credit Instrument, 20 Bus. Law. 359 (1965); Mendel, Financing Modem Com-
mercial Structures-Essentials of Documentation, 12 Bus. Law. 30 (1956); Rodgers, Ship
Construction Financing-Particularly Legal Problems Relating to Security, 12 Bus. Law. 142
(1957); Simpson, Ship Financing, 13 Bus. Law. 145 (1958); Williams, The Role of the
Commercial Lease in Corporate Finance, 22 Bus. Law. 751 (1967); Williams, The High
Credit Lease as Security-A Lawyer's Viewpoint, 12 Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel 1 (1954).
For a discussion of the importance of commercial leasing, see Boothe, The Practical Pros
& Cons of Leasing, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 1; McGraw & Greenblatt, Lease Financing of Capital
Equipment & Machinery by Business, 49 IlL BJ. 630 (1961); Comment, Equipment Leasing
Under the UCC, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 125 (1965).
2. Gustin, supra note 1, at 685, 698.
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tion. From the lender's standpoint, these transactions offer an attractive
investment outlet, especially if the return is higher than it would be if
the money were loaned directly to the high credit corporation.4 Moreover,
from an economic standpoint, they are an important financial technique
employed to create and develop major productive enterprises.
A common variation on the theme is often the shopping center develop-
ment. Here too, in most instances the developer-owner, who borrows the
money and signs the note, is not a financial giant. Before he can obtain
a commitment to borrow anything, he must produce a number of major
leases with high credit corporations so that the prospective lender will
be assured of a flow of rental income which, with other leases anticipated
for the development, will be sufficient, after payment of taxes and operat-
ing expenses, to service the debt.
To put the problem in perspective, assume a set of facts. Borrower (B)
asks lender (L) for a loan of $10,000,000 for a term of 30 years to be
secured by a mortgage on a warehouse to be occupied upon completion
by high credit corporation (C) under a long term lease. The lease pay-
ments, under the projections made by B, will be more than sufficient to
pay real estate taxes, operating expenses and principal and interest on
the loan. The projections assume that present tax provisions concerning
depreciation will continue. L agrees to make the mortgage loan but
requires that B's rights under the lease be assigned to L as security for
the loan.
The assignment might be in a separate instrument or it might be
contained in the mortgage or deed of trust. Instead of an assignment of
the lease, L might simply require an assignment of the rents coming due
under the lease. Again, the assignment of rents might be in a separate
instrument or in the mortgage or trust deed. Where a separate instrument
is used, C might be a party to the instrument and might make covenants
that run directly to L. The assignment of the lease or assignment of rents
might provide that all or merely a part of the rents coming due will be
paid to L or to a trustee. The agreement might be that, notwithstanding
the assignment, B may continue to collect all the rents until B defaults
under the terms of the loan. These variations may or may not influence
the effectiveness of the transaction as against a later federal tax lien
filed against B. While the variations will be considered later, at this
juncture assume the lease is assigned to L by a separate instrument and
that L has the right to collect all the rents from and after the time the loan
3. 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 41.1 (1965). A low-credit sub-
sidiary is set up so that the lender may have the benefit of the high credit corporation's credit
without establishing a debt that will appear on the high credit corporation's balance sheet. Id.
4. Gustin, supra note 1, at 685.
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is closed and until it is fully repaid, and that C has agreed to pay the
rents to L. Assume further that all rents collected by L under the assign-
ment are to be applied to interest and principal on the debt.5
Another variation, to be considered later, arises when the collateral
assigned is not a lease of, or rent for, real property but a contract or pay-
ments due under a contract governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.). Here, a high credit corporation may not be involved at all, but
the transaction may simply involve a common, garden variety security
interest in contract rights.6
Continue now with the assumed statement of facts. L makes the loan
to B, and takes a mortgage and an assignment of B's interest in the lease
which are both duly recorded. L immediately begins to collect rental pay-
ments from C and applies them to interest and principal on the debt.
Three years later B, who has been engaging in other business, becomes
delinquent in his federal income taxes. A federal tax lien7 is filed against
B in the county in which the lien is required to be recorded. The United
States serves a notice of levy on C demanding that future rental pay-
ments be paid to the United States rather than to L, in order to satisfy
B's tax liability.
This article considers the relative priority of an assignment of lease,
rents, or contract rights as against a later federal tax lien, particularly
with respect to the payments falling due under the lease or contract after
notice of the federal tax lien has been filed.8 Consideration will first be
given to the background of the problem. Next, there will be an explanation
of two theories supporting the thesis of this article that the assignment
S. This assumption is made in order to avoid raising and having to consider the effect of
the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), which states that any transfer of
property as security for a debt which leaves in the transferor the right to control the disposal
of the property is a fraud on creditors.
6. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-106 defines "Contract rights" as "any right to payment
under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper."
7. This article will concern itself with the general tax lien imposed upon a ta.xpayer for
non-payment of federal taxes. It should be noted that there are special liens for estate and
gift taxes which differ considerably from the general lien that is the topic of this article. The
estate and gift tax liens are contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6324(a),(b).
8. For an excellent earlier article on assignments of rents in general agreement with this
article see Havighurst, Relative Priority of Federal Tax Liens & Assignments of Rents in
Lease Financings, 19 Bus. Law. 939 (1964). For other related writing not necessarily in
agreement with the present article see generally 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at § 40.1-40.6;
W. Plumb & L. Wright, Federal Tax Liens (2d ed. 1967); Coogan, The Effect of the Federal
Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1968); Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities--Agenda for the Next
Decade pts. 1-3, 77 Yale Lj. 228, 605, 1104 (1967-1968).
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is valid as against a later federal tax lien: the no property theory and the
in esse theory. The effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 19669 on the
problem will then be examined. Finally, brief mention will be made of the
possible applicability of a purchase money priority.
II. BACKGROUND
If a taxpayer fails or refuses to pay a tax to the federal government
after a demand for payment has been made, the Government is given a
lien on all "property and rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer.10
This lien can be foreclosed," or the Government may enforce it adminis-
tratively by way of a levy.' 2 In many cases, however, the Government is
made a party defendant in the foreclosure of another lien, and in such
cases, the Government lien is given effect through the assertion of the
appropriate priority against the proceeds produced at the foreclosure
sale.13
The federal tax lien is effective for some purposes from the date of
assessment even though its existence is not disclosed to the taxpayer or
the public.' 4 Under an early case interpreting the first tax lien statute, a
secret federal tax lien was successfully asserted against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser more than four years after he had purchased the
property from a delinquent taxpayer.' 5 Recognizing the inequity, Con-
gress provided in later acts that notice of the federal tax lien had to be
filed"0 in order for the lien to be valid as against certain interests.17 As to
other interests, even filing of the federal tax lien was made insufficient;
rather, actual knowledge was required.' Indeed, in limited circumstances,
9. 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
11. nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7403.
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6331.
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7425.
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322.
15. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(f).
17. The first tax lien act passed by Congress permitted the secret lien to have priority
over a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the taxpayer's property. Act of July 13, 1866,
ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107. Congress rectified this shortcoming in the law by providing in
subsequent acts for the protection of purchases, mortgagees, judgment creditors, Act of
March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016, and pledgees, Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401,
53 Stat. 882.
18. Since discovering tax liens by means of searching the files of designated offices was
in many cases impractical the Government later developed "superpriorities," namely a class
of interests which would prevail even over existing and properly filed tax liens. This class
included purchasers of motor vehicles, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(b) (2), originating
in the Revenue Act of 1964, § 236, 78 Stat. 127, and purchasers and lenders on the strength
of "securities," Revenue Act of 1939, § 401, 53 Stat. 882. See generally, Plumb, supra
note 8, at 229-33.
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most recently, even actual knowledge has been determined legislatively
not to suffice. 19
The earliest federal tax lien statute did not indicate what priority the
federal tax lien was to be given as against competing liens.2 0 The Supreme
Court eventually confirmed, what had long been assumed, that the priority
of the federal tax lien was to be governed by the familiar rule, first in time
is first in right.21 Thus, if there were an earlier lien on the taxpayer's
property when the federal tax lien arose, the earlier lien (subject to
requirements to be considered) would be entitled to priority.
The first in time, first in right rule of the federal tax lien may seem
surprisingly liberal to anyone accustomed to the fact that state and local
real estate taxes are secured by liens that are given priority over earlier
liens on the property. However, this difference in treatment is essential
because of the difference in the taxes. State and local real estate taxes are
ad valorem taxes, levied partly to pay for police, fire and other essential
services rendered to the property. Generally, they bear a reasonable
relationship to the value of the property. However, federal tax liens arise
to secure delinquent taxes completely unrelated to any particular property.
The delinquency might be for income taxes, withholding taxes or any of
a number of different taxes, any one of which could far exceed the value of
any or all the property of the taxpayer..2 2 While a lender can take steps
to protect himself against real estate taxes (by lending only part of the
value of the property and by checking for the payment of real estate
taxes), it would be considerably more difficult to protect against the wide
variety of federal taxes which may exceed by far the value of the property
and which would be incomparably more difficult to police for payment.
In any event, while the Supreme Court said that the priority of the
federal tax lien was governed by the first in time, first in right doctrine,
starting in 19 50 23 it held in a series of cases that, for an earlier competing
lien to be entitled to priority over a later federal tax lien, the competing
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(b)(1)-(2).
20. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107 where it is stated that "if any
person, bank, association, company, or corporation, liable to pay any tax, shall neglect or
refuse to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States
from the time it was due until paid, with the interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue
in addition thereto, upon all property and rights to property belonging to such person, bank,
association, company, or corporation... !
21. See Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 175, 179 (1827) where Chief Justice
Marshall stated: "The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior
claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction . . . 2' This principle was first applied in the
tax lien field in United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
22. United States v. Schroeder, 204 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Iowa 1962). While the record
does not so indicate, the fact that the federal lien far exceeded the value of the property
has been established from the files of the mortgagee, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
23. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
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lien had to be "choate." This doctrine of the choate lien was developed
initially in cases arising under the so-called insolvency priority statute,
24
an anachronism dating back to the earliest days of the republic.
Meeting the Supreme Court's test for a choate lien, which will be con-
sidered in greater detail in Part IV, soon became a challenging ordeal.
Indeed, there was dicta that perhaps no lien could prevail against the
Government under the insolvency priority statute. 0 Ingenious lawyers,
seeking to protect their clients, sought alternate solutions. One that
was finally found and assiduously fostered will next be considered.
III. "No PROPERTY" THEORY
As has been mentioned, a federal tax lien that arises against a delin-
quent taxpayer attaches to all "property and rights to property belonging
to" the taxpayer.28 Obviously and quite rationally, the lien does not attach
to property belonging to someone else. However, as in so many areas of
the law, stating the rule is easier than applying it.
As the Supreme Court developed the choate lien doctrine to the point
where few competing liens against a delinquent taxpayer's property were
24. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
25. The present statute is in substantially the same form as when enacted in the Act of
March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515. Its roots can be traced back even further in the
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 19, 1 Stat. 42. Later the Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65,
1 Stat. 676 was passed. This Act created the companion provision which placed personal
liability on one who paid in violation of the priority. The subsequent Act presently exists
in 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964). However, efforts have been recently made to amend the statute.
While Congress was considering the passage of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the ABA
recommended changing the insolvency statute. The ABA's effort failed because their proposal
was delayed in several Congressional committees. See Coogan, supra note 8, at 1380.
Despite this setback present attempts are being made to correct the statute. See Report of
Committee on Relative Priority of Government and Private Liens, Section of Real Property
Probate and Trust Law, ABA, 3 Real Property Probate & Trust J. 209 (1968). See generally
Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the
Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L.J. 905 (1954).
26. See New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1932).
27. For example, three theories have been asserted in an attempt to elevate a performance
bond surety's claim above the government's with regard to contract funds owed the
contractor-defaulting taxpayer. The first is that the surety by paying the contractor's debts
which exist as liens against the property of the owner is subrogated to the owner's rights.
Included as one of these rights is the right to the retained contract payments which the
contractor failed to earn due to his breach of contract. The second is that the surety is
subrogated to the rights of the lienholders it has paid off. As a consequence of reimbursing
the materialmen the surety is entitled to the benefit of their liens. And the third is that the
surety has a secured interest in the contract fund due to an assignment made by the contractor
of his rights to the unpaid contract fund. Panel Discussion, Dangers Under Recent Federal
Tax Lien Decisions, 14 Bus. Law. 12, 21-27 (1958); see Creedon, Federal Tax Liens: A
Panel Discussion-Summarized, 15 Bus. Law. 175 (1959).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
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able to prevail against a later federal tax lien, the bar reacted vigorously
against decisions favoring the federal lien and a crescendo of criticism
appeared in legal literature.29 Some of the criticism suggested that there
was more than a question of lien priorities involved in the decisions;
rather, there was a constitutional question of property rights: the Govern-
ment was taking Peter's property to pay Paul's taxes.3°
Perhaps partly in response to that criticism, the Supreme Court began
to pay closer attention to the question of whether or not the property or
rights to property involved in a dispute in fact "belonged to" the taxpayer.
At the same time, the practicing bar sought to develop the no property
theory. Eventually, the Court may have grasped and expanded the doctrine
as a means of escaping from the dilemma created by the choate lien
theory which, in the push to its logical conclusion, caused some unfortu-
nate and unfair results.3 In any event, decisions were rendered and
allowed to stand on the ground that the taxpayer had "no property or
rights to property" to which the federal tax lien could attach when, in
fact, it would seem he did have some interest in the property for other
purposes.
The first case in which the no property doctrine attracted attention in
the tax lien area was United States v. Bess. 32 In dispute were life insurance
proceeds on the life of a deceased delinquent taxpayer. The taxpayer's
29. See, e.g., 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 903 (Supp. 1964); Creedon, On Mortgage Fore-
closures and Federal Tax Liens, 18 Bus. Law. 1117 (1963); Cross, Federal Tax Claims:
Nature and Effect of the Government's Weapons for Collection, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 1
(1958); Friesen, Collection of Federal Taxes Out of the Taxpayer's Property: A Judicial
Shell Game, 9 U. Kan. L. Rev. 263 (1961); Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont:
The Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 724
(1965); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career
or the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale LJ. 905 (1954); MacIachlan, Current Develop-
ments Relating to Federal Liens and Priorities, 66 Com. L.J. 265 (1961); Mitchell, The
Tax Lien Priority: An Injustice to Creditors, 14 Hastings LJ. 52 (1962); Mitchell, The
Choateness Doctrine-Both Unconscionable and Unconstitutional, 38 Conn. B.J. 252 (1964);
Myers, The Fall and Rise of the Security Interest, 6 Prac. Law. 60 (Dec. 1960); Plumb,
Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 Tax L. Rev. 459 (1958); Shanks, The Tax
Lien Tamed, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 339 (1961); Wolson, Federal Tax Liens-A Study in Con-
fusion and Confiscation, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 180 (1959); Note, Federal Priorities and Tax
Liens, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1259 (1963); Comment, Federal Tax Lien Priority: An Injustice
to Creditors, 14 Hastings L.J. 52 (1962); Comment, Federal Tax Liens and Assignees
of Accounts Receivable: Priority without Reason, 29 U. ChLi. L. Rev. 548 (1962); 47 Cornell
L.Q. 308 (1962).
30. Plumb, supra note 29, at 459.
31. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); United States v. Buffalo
Say. Bank, 371 US. 228 (1963); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010
(1956). For a discussion of United States v. Buffalo Say. Bank, supra, see Creedon, supra
note 29.
32. 357 U.S. 51 (1958). See also Commissioner v. Stem, 357 US. 39 (1958) decided the
same day as Bess.
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wife, who was the named beneficiary, claimed that the insurance proceeds
were not her deceased husband's property because he had no right to get
them when he was alive. His death was necessary before the proceeds
could become payable. The Government argued that he owned the policy
before his death and that the Government lien attached to his ownership
interest before he died. Since he owned the policy and could have changed
the beneficiary or otherwise dealt with the policy, the Government felt
that the proceeds should be subject to its lien after his death.
The Supreme Court took a middle position and in the process brushed
aside some sacrosanct life insurance dogma. 8 It held that under New
Jersey law the taxpayer did have "property" in this policy prior to his
death, but that his ownership interest gave him only a right to receive the
cash surrender value of the policy, not the full insurance proceeds. Thus,
the Government lien attached to the cash surrender value, and the tax-
payer's death did not affect the lien on that value. However, the lien
did not attach to the insurance proceeds to the extent they exceeded
the cash surrender value, and the wife-beneficiary was entitled to this
excess.
On the surface, there appears to be merit to the distinction made by
the Court. However, on further analysis the distinction presents diffi-
culties. It is true that the policy owner could have obtained only the cash
surrender value from the insurance company while he lived. Yet, it must
be recognized that the taxpayer was the complete owner of the policy. He
could have changed the beneficiary (naming the Government), have sold
or transferred the policy or have borrowed on it. The decision does not
33. It is well settled that one who insures another's life is obligated to perform a number
of promises, one of which is to pay upon the insured's death the amount of the policy to his
beneficiary. Another is to pay the insured the policy's cash surrender value if he chooses to
cancel the policy. United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956). Until the Insured
elects to cancel the policy and obtain the cash surrender value "it seems apparent under any
standard that the insurer holds neither 'property' nor 'rights to property' [in the amount
that would be paid if the policy were surrendered] to which a tax lien could attach but Is
simply the obligor to a broadly based chose in action arising out of a substantially executory
contract." United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1964); see United States
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v. Pennsylvania
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1942); United States v. Mitchell, 210 F. Supp. 810
(S.D. Ala. 1962), aff'd, 349 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1965). Clearly when the insured pays premiums
they become the insurer's property, and, therefore, the insured has no property interest In
them. Consequently there is no fund of money in the insurer's possession prior to the in-
sured's decision to take the cash surrender value, so there is no fund to which a tax lien
could attach. United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956). "It follows from what
we have said that there is no logical escape from holding that the 'surrender value' comes to
an end on the insured's death, if we dispose of the controversy in accordance with the
ordinary rules governing contracts." Id. at 506-07.
[Vol. 37
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indicate the facts surrounding the insured's death. Suppose, however,
he knew and could have established to a third person's satisfaction that
he was near death. Can there be any doubt that the policy value would
then be greater than the cash surrender value and that le could have
realized such value? He still would not have been able to obtain the
insurance proceeds from the insurance company but he could have
obtained a sum close to that amount from someone else. To hold then
that his death eliminates the tax lien from all policy value other than the
cash surrender values seems somewhat inconsistent with the decision that
his death left unaffected the lien on the cash surrender value. Nevertheless,
the decision is grounded on the remedies of lien creditors generally and
perhaps partly on public policy.
In Bess, the Court stressed two doctrines. First, it held that in deciding
whether or not there is "property or rights to property" belonging to
the taxpayer the courts must look to state law. While perhaps not entirely
clear from the opinion, especially in the light of later developments, the
Court seemed to indicate that once the nature of the rights and interests
of the taxpayer have been determined under state law, then federal law
would determine whether or not such rights and interests constitute
"property or rights to property" to which a federal tax lien will attach.3 4
Second, Bess held that once it is decided that the taxpayer has "property
or rights to property," the consequences of the federal tax lien attaching
to that property are a matter of federal law.35
The next no property doctrine cases considered by the Court were
Aquilino v. United States0 and United States v. Durhlam Lumber Co."7
The former, a New York case, came up through the state courts;3 8 the
34. Apparently the Bess court concluded that it was clear under New Jersey law that an
individual who could not realize the proceeds of an insurance policy had no property rights
to the proceeds. Consequently, the Court felt no need as it did in Aquilino to remand the
case for a determination by the state courts of the state law on the subject.
35. Under state law the insured's contract right would disappear when he died. See cases
cited note 33, supra. A consequence of the application of state law, therefore, would he that
a tax lien existing during the taxpayer's life would be cut off by his death. The Supreme
Court held, however, that once a federal tax lien attaches the consequences of that attachment
are to be determined by federal not state law. The Court solved the difficult conceptual
problem that the cash surrender value disappeared upon the death of the insured by stating
that the "cash surrender value should be treated for some purposes as though in fact a 'fund'
held by the insurer for the benefit of the insured." United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 59
(1958). Therefore, the Court applied federal law to determine the consequences of the
attachment.
36. 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
37. 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
38. Aquilino v. United States, 2 App. Div. 2d 747, 153 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Ist Dep't 1956),
rev'd, 3 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.YS.2d 9 (1957).
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latter, a North Carolina case, involved a bankruptcy action and took the
federal court route. 9 Both involved the claims of subcontractors against
funds held by owners of real estate who had contracted for certain im-
provements. The contractor in each case defaulted both under the sub-
contract and in the payment of his federal taxes. The Government and
the subcontractors claimed the funds held by the property owners. The
subcontractors (whose liens arose after the federal tax liens were filed
against the contractor-taxpayers) argued that the Government liens did
not attach to the funds in dispute because the contractor-taxpayer had no
"property right" in the funds. The Government argued that the subcon-
tractors' liens arose after the federal liens and were inchoate. The New
York Court of Appeals agreed with the Government; 40 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals sided with the subcontractors.4 '
The Supreme Court fell back on Bess.42 It held that in deciding whether
or not the funds were property belonging to the taxpayer, it was necessary
to consult applicable state law. The fourth circuit had already considered
state law and decided in the negative so the Supreme Court affirmed.4"
New York had not sufficiently considered state law influences so the
Court remanded.44 The New York Court of Appeals was directed to
explore and determine whether under applicable lien law the contractor-
taxpayer holds bare legal title to the sum due from the owner, as trustee
for the subcontractor, or whether it has full ownership of the debt,
subject only to a lien in favor of the subcontractor. As was perhaps to
be expected, on remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
contractor-taxpayer had no "property" interest in the funds.4"
A closer analysis of Aquilino on remand may be in order. Involved
was the construction of earlier trust fund provisions of New York's Lien
Law.40 They provided that "'[t]he funds received by a contractor from
an owner for the improvement of real property ... constitute trust funds
in the hands of such contractor to be applied first to the payment of claims
of subcontractors. . . 2,' However, the trust was not a trust "of the
usual kind." The features that caused its departure from normalcy were:
39. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 363 U.S.
522 (1960).
40. Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957).
41. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958).
42. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
43. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
44. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
45. Aquilino v. United States, 10 N.Y.2d 271, 176 N.E.2d 826, 219 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1961).
46. Ch. 859, § 18, [1930] N.Y. Laws 1603, as amended N.Y. Lien Law §§ 70-79 (1966).
47. Aquilino v. United States, 10 N.Y.2d 271, 275, 176 N.E.2d 826, 828, 219 N.Y.S.2d 254,
257 (1961).
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"(1) that the contractor-trustee is not under the necessity of holding the
fund intact until the improvement is completed, required as he is to pay
the claims of the subcontractors as they mature; (2) that the contractor-
trustee may, under specified conditions, assign his rights to future pay-
ments due from an owner...; (3) that the contractor-trustee is privileged
to commingle funds . . .; and (4) that the remedy available is a class
action rather than one prosecutable by an individual ... ."', Judge Fuld
had little difficulty in reasoning that none of these four features gave the
contractor any "property interest" in the fund. Rather he found: "[S]uch
funds are to be 'applied first' to the payment of the statutory beneficiaries.
The contractor has a beneficial interest only in so much of the proceeds
as remain after the claims of all beneficiaries have been settled.""
Presumably Judge Fuld concluded that the taxpayer held "bare legal
title" to the sum due from the owner rather than "full ownership of the
debt, subject only to a lien in favor of the subcontractor."
While the result in Aquilino certainly seems sound from a policy stand-
point, the decision is not without its logical difficulties. True, the con-
tractor was required to pay the subcontractors first, but clearly, after
paying them, the contractor was entitled to the proceeds. Prior to paying
them did he have an existing right to property, that is, the right to the
proceeds after paying the subcontractor? Obviously, the right to keep the
proceeds was subject to a condition. But was not this right a thing of
value? Could not it have been transferred for value? If so, would not the
federal tax lien have attached to that right whenever it arose? If so, on
the reasoning in Bess,50 would not the consequences of the tax lien attach-
ing be a matter of federal law, so that when the contractor failed to pay
the subcontractors, the effect of that failure vis-&.-vis the federal lien
would be federally determined? The contrary reasoning might be that the
contractor had no right to property until he paid the subcontractors. Is
the holding then that a right to property that is conditional is not a right
to which a federal tax lien will attach?5'
Furthermore, the holding that the contractor did not have a sufficient
beneficial interest in the fund to constitute "property or a right to prop-
erty" in the proceeds seems somewhat inconsistent with his power to as-
sign the proceeds under conditions specified in the Lien Law and thereby
defeat the rights of the subcontractors. Would such an assignee also de-
feat an existing federal tax lien against the assignor? Although Judge Fuld
masterfully and persuasively rationalized the result on trust principles,
48. Id. at 280, 176 NX.E2d at 831-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
51. See In re Halprin, 280 F2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960) for a holding to such effect.
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an uneasy feeling remains that a contractor has something more than bare
legal title. Suppose a borrower and lender agreed in a particular trans-
action that all of certain moneys to be received by the borrower would
be held "in trust" for the benefit of the lender. Would such a trust be
any less effective than the statutory trust provided in the Lien Law?
No persuasive reason for a different result is immediately apparent. In
each case, the taxpayer would have the right to the trust funds only after
a third party was paid first. To distinguish because of the nature of the
contract between the taxpayer and the third party would seem specious.
And if the result would be the same, does the magic word "trust" dictate
the result or can the same result be reached if the taxpayer's substantive
rights are substantially the same although the form of the transaction is
somewhat different? More will be said about this question later.62
In Durham Lumber, the fourth circuit court reached the same result
as in Aquilino without benefit of the trust fund doctrine. Instead, it was
stressed that the subcontractors had an independent cause of action
against the property owners.53 Thus, the subcontractors were claiming
their own property from the owners and not the contractor's property.
Here too, however, the contractor clearly had some rights against the
owner, both before the subcontractors gave notice of their claims to the
owners and, contingently, after the subcontractors were paid.
Finally, in Aquilino and Durham Lumber the relationship between
state law and federal law in determining what is "property or rights to
property" was not articulated as clearly as it had been in earlier cases on
which Bess relied 4 and, indeed, even as clearly as in Bess itself. 5 In
Aquilino the Court indicated that state law is to be applied "in ascertain-
ing the taxpayers' property rights .... " " Then it remanded so that the
New York courts could "ascertain the property interests of the taxpayer
under state law and then dispose of the case according to established
principles of law."157 Also in Durham Lumber the Court indicated that the
fourth circuit's "characterization of the taxpayers' property interests"
under North Carolina state law was not clearly erroneous or unreason-
able."8
52. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
53. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1958).
54. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Housing Authority, 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957). See also
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
55. Justice Brennan stated that "[slince § 3670 creates no property rights but merely
attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law, ... we must look
first to Mr. Bess' right in the policies as defined by state law." United States v. Bess, 357 U.S.
51, 55 (1958).
56. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 514 (1960).
57. Id. at 516.
58. United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1960).
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These cases have been interpreted as holding that state law determines
whether or not there is "property or rights to property" to which a federal
tax lien will attach. 9 It would seem, however, that state law should merely
determine what rights and interests the taxpayer has and that federal
law should determine whether those rights or interests constitute property
to which the tax lien will attach. Judge Fuld's decision in Aquilino, on
remand, can be interpreted as making this dual determination.
It is possible but doubtful that the Court meant to leave to state law
the determination of whether or not the taxpayer has "property or rights
to property" that are subject to the tax lien. It is one thing to hold that
federal law does not' create rights; it is another to hold that a state's
characterization of rights as "property" or "no property" will necessarily
control. For example, in Milton Savings Bank v. United States,cO the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clearly indicated that mortgaged
real estate is not property of the taxpayer. Under Massachusetts law, the
mortgagor has "merely an equity of redemption accompanied by a right
to possession."61 Despite this pronouncement a lower federal court
refused to so hold in a tax lien case.2
Characterizing the rights and interests of a taxpayer as "property" or
"no property" would seem to involve a difficult determination at best,
whether federal, state or both federal and state law apply. As pointed
out in Justice Harlan's dissent in Aquilino, leaving the matter partly to
state law invites "dubious distinctions."" How many rights must be in
the taxpayer's bundle and what must be their nature and shape before
they are to be classified as "property"? Nevertheless, the Court's decision
that federal law does not "create" rights seems clearly sound; therefore
one is forced to look to state law for a determination of what rights exist.
Assuming that federal law is to determine whether or not state-created
rights are to be classified as property for federal tax lien purposes, what
standards, if any, do Bess, Durham Lumber, and Aquilino suggest will
influence the determination? In Bess, the cash surrender value which could
have been obtained during the taxpayer's life was held to be property; the
insurance proceeds, which were contingent on his death, were held not
to be property. The fact that the taxpayer owned all rights under the
policy and could have transferred it for value, either outright or as
security, did not affect the classification of the insurance policy. Perhaps
then the standard is that the federal tax lien does not attach to rights the
59. See Young, Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. Chli. L. Rev. 723 (1967).
60. 345 Mass. 302, 187 N.E.2d 379 (1963).
61. Id. at 305, 187 N.E2d at 381.
62. United States v. Rahar's Inn, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1965).
63. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 521 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
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exercise of which is subject to a contingency, even though such rights may
be of value for some purposes. In Aquilino the taxpayer had certain rights
in the contract proceeds. He could have assigned them under certain
circumstances and defeated the subcontractors' rights. He would have
been entitled to them after the subcontractors were paid. Here too then,
the taxpayer's right was conditional, and it also could have been of value.
In Durham Lumber the taxpayer's rights were also conditioned on the
subcontractors' being paid first, and it was stressed that the subcon-
tractors had direct rights against the owners. Consequently, whether the
federal tax lien attaches might depend in part on the nature of the interest
of the competing party.
Several days after the Court decided Aquilino the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals decided In re Halprin.0 4 There, Halprin, a manufacturer,
contracted with Doniger and Company to sew and complete jackets.
Under the contract, Halprin was to receive a fixed sum upon delivery of
the jackets. On February 2, 1956, after the contact was made, a notice
of federal tax lien was filed against Halprin. Still later, Halprin borrowed
money from Commercial Sales, Inc. to meet current payrolls. Halprin
irrevocably assigned to Commercial as security for the loan all sums to
become due under the contract with Doniger. Doniger was notified of the
assignment and agreed to pay Commercial all sums due under the contract.
Thereafter, Halprin delivered some jackets under the contract to Doniger
and the money owed by Doniger under the contract was claimed by both
the Government under its tax lien and by Commercial under its assign-
ment.
The third circuit first decided that the federal tax lien did not attach
to the executory contract between Halprin and Doniger. Such a wholly
executory contract, said the court, was not property to which the federal
tax lien would attach, again reflecting the principle that the tax lien does
not attach to a contingent or conditional right. Next the court held that
the assignment by Halprin to Doniger created a valid security interest
under the U.C.C. Furthermore, it observed that Doniger's agreement
to pay Commercial gave Commercial a direct right against Doniger and
that Halprin "ceased to be entitled even formally, much less beneficially,
to receive Doniger's performance."0 5 Therefore, before Halprin had any
property under the contract to which the federal tax lien could attach,
Halprin had transferred all monies due under the contract to Commercial.
A final point made by the court was that the loan from Commercial was
used to finance Halprin's contract with Doniger so that Commercial might
64. 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960).
65. Id. at 409.
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equitably be regarded as entitled to a "purchase money priority" as
against competing claimants.
Unfortunately, In re Halprin was not appealed to the Supreme Court.
To date, however, it stands as the most direct authority for application
of the no property theory to an assignment for security purposes. Under-
standably, except for the purchase money aspects, Halprin is a difficult
case for the Government because it seems to enable a taxpayer to assign
future monies effectively even after a federal tax lien has arisen.
There is also contrary authority, although it is probably only dicta.
In United States v. LS?. Foy Construction Co.,6 the tenth circuit ex-
pressly rejected the no property theory but nevertheless held for the
assignee on the ground that it held a "choate" lien. In Foy the bank's
assignment antedated the federal tax lien but part of the taxpayer's
indebtedness to the bank was contracted after notice of the tax lien was
filed. The bank urged the no property theory presumably hoping that its
acceptance would result in protection of the full indebtedness as against
the tax lien. In reversing, the tenth circuit found that the assignment was
the equivalent of a mortgage; hence the taxpayer had "property" in the
form of an equity of redemption. Accordingly, the bank-assignee was
entitled to priority over the later federal tax lien only to the extent that
its lien was choate as of the date of tax lien filing. The same result could
have been reached by holding that the taxpayer had "no property" in the
fund to the extent that the fund had been assigned for debt existing as of
the date of the tax lien filing. Such a result would be completely consistent
with the rationale in Aquilino, and a comparable result presumably would
be reached in an Aquilino type of case if the subcontractor had two claims
against the fund held by the property owner, one of which was entitled
to trust fund protection and the other of which was a claim of lesser
dignity.67
66. 300 F2d 207 (10th Cir. 1962).
67. The decision in Crest Fin. Co. v. United States, 368 US. 347 (1961) (per curiam),
considered later, would not seem to be authority against application of the "no property"
theory to assignments for security. The "no property" argument was made at several levels,
but the case was ultimately decided in favor of the finance company on the basis that it had
a choate lien. In Crest Finance the government conceded that the assignments created a
choate lien entitled to priority over the tax lien. The government in its memorandum stated
that this "concession makes it unnecessary to consider petitioner's alternative contention
here ... that the taxpayer had no 'property' interest in the assigned accounts to which the
tax lien could attach. We may note, however, that that argument, made for the first time
in the petition for rehearing in the court of appeals in an effort to bring this case within the
rationale of United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 US. 522, and Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U-S. 509, is foreclosed by the stipulation and district court finding that the
amounts due on the contract 'belonged' to the taxpayer. . . .Nor do we agree that the
result in this case is inconsistent ...with In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407 (C.A.3), and City
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Where does this review of the case law on the no property doctrine
lead as far as assignments for security are concerned? Reverting to our
assumed set of facts 8 we find that on the date the federal tax lien arose,
the lease and all payments coming due under it had been assigned as
security for the loan. The tenant C under the lease agreed with L to pay
the rents directly to L. As in Aquilino, B has no right to the rents until
L is paid. As in Durham Lumber, L has the right to proceed directly
against C. If anything L's rights are stronger than in Halprin because
the assignment of the lease antedated the federal tax lien.
Should a distinction be made between the Aquilino and Durham Lumber
cases and our assumed facts, as was made in Foy, that an assignment for
security is really a mortgage from which the assignor has an equity of
redemption? Should it make a difference whether the lender is deemed to
have title or merely a lien under applicable state law? Hopefully, the
label will not control. Is the assignment of lease and payments due there-
under merely a mortgage or pledge or is it something more? A mortgage
is a conveyance of property as security for a debt, which, depending on
applicable state law, conveys title or creates a lien.00 One usually thinks
of a mortgage in terms of real or tangible personal property. The mort-
gaged property constitutes security, in the sense that if the mortgagor
fails to pay the debt, his equity of redemption may be foreclosed either
by a foreclosure sale or other procedure and the proceeds of sale
applied against the debt. Is this the kind of interest that an assignee of a
lease, rents or contract rights has? Clearly, he has something more.
Under our assumed facts, L is actually collecting the rents due under the
lease and applying them to the debt. He does not sell them upon default;
he has an operative assignment which gives him full rights to the rents
as against B and C. He can sue C for the rents; he has parted with money
in consideration of the assignment. B has no right to the rents until L
is paid, just as in Aquilino and Durham Lumber the contractors had no
right to the contract proceeds until the subcontractors were paid. Actually
in A quilino the contractor had greater rights than B. The contractor
could have obtained the money but would have had to hold it in trust. B
has no right to the rents at all until L is paid. It is submitted, therefore,
on the authority of Aquilino and Durham Lumber, that a taxpayer who
has assigned a lease under the conditions set forth in the assumed facts"0
of New York v. United States, 283 F.2d 829 (CA.2). In Halprin, the court found a novatlon,
and in City of New York, there had been a recorded absolute assignment to a general assignee
for the benefit of creditors, who administered the property under court supervision." Memo-
randum for the United States at 9 n.4, Crest Fin. Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1961).
68. See text accompanying note 5.
69. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § lb(1),(2) (1949).
70. See text accompanying note S.
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should generally be regarded under state law as having effectively as-
signed the lease and rents due thereunder and that his conditional right
to get the rents after paying L should not be regarded as "property or
rights to property" to which a federal tax lien will attach under the fed-
eral law. To hold otherwise, as suggested in Foy, would seem to place un-
due emphasis on form and not enough on substance. Labels such as title,
lien, security and property should not obscure the essential, substantive
rights involved. The federal tax lien competes against numerous kinds of
conflicting interests. In Aquilino, the taxpayer had a contract with an
owner and a subcontractor. In the assumed facts," the taxpayer has a
contract with a tenant and a lender. In each case, the contracting parties
had rights superior to those of the taxpayer. The label placed on those
rights should not control whether or not the tax lien attaches. Nothing in
the Internal Revenue Code would seem to require that result.
Turning now to some of the variations mentioned earlier,7" the same
result should obtain whether there is an assignment of a lease, rents, a
contract or payments due thereunder. If the lender has advanced his loan
prior to filing of the federal tax lien and if applicable state law validates
the assignment so that the taxpayer has no right to the funds until L
has been paid, there would seem to be no reason to distinguish these cases.
Whether the assignment is in the mortgage, the deed of trust or in a sepa-
rate instrument, and whether the high credit corporation is a party to the
instrument or not, as long as L has the right under state law to collect the
payments and apply them to its debt, it would seem that the federal tax
lien should not attach to B's conditional right to get the rents. Finally,
the result should be the same whether C is obligated to pay L or L's
trustee.
If the facts are changed, so that B does have the right to collect the
rents until a default occurs, then it would seem that the no property doc-
trine should be inapplicable. The federal tax lien would attach to B's
property, including the right to receive the rents, and the relative pri-
ority of the tax lien and L's claim to the rents would be decided under
federal tax lien law. Query, whether L could assert the no property doc-
trine, if the language of assignment required B to hold all rents "in trust"
for L after a default has occurred and state law validated such a trust?
IV. "IN ESSE" THEoRY-PR-1966-THE CHOATE LIEN DocT m
If the threshold question73 of whether the taxpayer has "property
or rights to property" is, despite the foregoing analysis, decided in the
affirmative, then L must seek other grounds for claiming priority over the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512 (1960).
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subsequent federal tax lien. Before considering the present statutory pro-
visions which should control L's fate, it seems desirable to review the doc-
trine of the choate74 lien briefly and particularly its impact on the area of
assignments. Such review may have special merit because there are indica-
tions that the choate lien doctrine survived the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, 75 except to the extent the Act provided otherwise.10
On numerous occasions before passage of the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, the Supreme Court made it clear that if a competing lien against a
taxpayer was to take priority over a Government lien, the competing lien
had to be choate.7" At times, the Court alternated and said the competing
lien had to be perfected.7" In either event, the Court required as a mini-
mum that the amount of the lien, the property subject to the lien and the
74. A great deal of interest and controversy has arisen from the Supreme Court's use of
the word "choate." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hammes v. Tucson
Newspapers Inc., 324 F.2d 101, 102 n.1 (9th Cir. 1963) commenting upon it stated that
"[w]e do not find it particularly couth, and use it only because the Supreme Court has
revived it in federal tax lien cases." Mr. Plumb, one of leading authorities in the field, has
indicated that the word "choate" apparently was not listed in most dictionaries until it was
placed in vogue by the Supreme Court, giving rise to the implication that prior to the Su-
preme Court's use of the word it had no existence. Plumb believes that the word was Incor-
rectly derived from "inchoate" by dropping a prefix that means "on" rather than "not."
Plumb, supra note 8, at 230 n.15. "Inchoate" is derived from the Latin "incohatus" which
means to grasp or "only begun." Since "inchoate" can be defined as meaning incomplete It
was easy to be misled into concluding that inchoate also meant not choate. Consequently,
Webster 2d listed choate as a "rare" meaning for complete. In Webster 3d the classification
of "rare" was dropped. D. Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law 76 (1963). Under the fore-
going reasoning there is no Latin word "cohatus" or "choatus," and its equivalent does not
appear in any other language. Letter from F. Stuart Crawford to John Creedon, Jan. 31,
1966. H. F. Birnbaum disagrees. He suggests that the word "choate" has the Greek root
"choo" which means "heap or pile up." Therefore, the "in" prefixed to "inchoate" may be
used in the negative sense. Inchoate means not fully heaped or piled up and so "means
begun as distinguished from completed." Letter from H. F. Birnbaum to William T. Plumb,
June 2, 1958. Consequently the word still remains a topic for debate.
75. In H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966) it was stated that "[uinder
decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee, or judgment creditor is protected at the
time notice of the tax lien is filed if the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the
lien, and the amount of the lien are all established at such time. See United States v. City
of New Britain . . . .Except as otherwise provided, subsection (a) of new section 6323
retains this basic rule of Federal law." See Coogan, supra note 8, at 1381; Plumb, supra note
8, at 232.
76. H.R. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 75.
77. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964) ; United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co.,
374 U.S. 84 (1963) ; United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per
curiam); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Security
Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
78. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
identity of the lienor be certain.79 The time at which the competing lien
had to have these attributes of certainty varied in varying circumstances. s°
Moreover, it has been suggested that there may be additional require-
ments for a competing lien to be choate,81 if the lien is competing against
the Government's priority under the so-called insolvency priority statute.82
The requirements that the amount of the lien and the identity of the
lienor be certain when notice of the federal tax lien is recorded pose no
problem under our assumed facts." L is the holder of the lien and he has
advanced $10,000,000 long before tax lien filing. The third requirement
of specificity of the property subject to the lien requires closer analysis.
This question was before the Court in the interesting and unique case
of Crest Finance Co. v. United States."4 Twin, a subcontractor, had con-
tracted with Standard to supply labor and materials for the construction
of an Illinois Toll Road. During March and June of 1958, Crest Finance
loaned over $67,000 to Twin and took an assignment of the account re-
ceivable from Standard as security for the loan. Standard was notified of
the assignment and made some payments directly to Crest. The United
States filed notice of a tax lien against Twin on October 9, 1958. A dis-
pute arose as to the relative priority of the assignment for security and
the later tax lien. As of the date of tax lien filing, the exact amount of the
assigned account receivable had not been definitely determined, although
Twin had performed the work. It was later determined to be $17,369.94.
The Government argued that the assignment of the account receivable
was anminchoate lien because the property subject to the lien was not fixed
and certain as of the date of tax lien filing-the exact amount of the
account receivable being unknown.
The district court found for the United States. 5 The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed" on the ground that Crest Finance's lien
was inchoate, citing, inter alia, R. F. Ball Construction Co. v. United
79. Id.
80. Under the tax Hen statute the non-federal lien had to be perfected at the time when
the tax lien arose. However, if the lienholder were a mortgagee, purchaser or judgment
creditor perfection did not have to take place until notice of the tax lien was filed by the
collector. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 36, §§ 3670, 3672, 53 Stat. 449 (now Int. lv.
Code of 1954, §§ 6321, 6323(a)).
81. See United States v. Waddill, Holland & Finn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 358 (1945).
82. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
83. Since in most security arrangements involving high credit leases and contracts the debt
(hence the amount of the lien) is specific, the amount of the lien, seldom causes problems.
See Havighurst, supra note 8, at 953.
84. 368 U.S. 347 (1961) (per curiam).
85. See United States v. Crest Fin. Co., 291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961).
86. Id. at 5.
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States.87 Crest Finance petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Solicitor General Cox then submitted a memorandum to the Court ad-
mitting that the Government had argued the case incorrectly before the
seventh circuit and that Ball was not controlling. He suggested that the
Court remand so the circuit court could determine whether the assign-
ment of the account receivable had to be recorded under Illinois law to be
effective. If recording was not necessary, the Solicitor General conceded
that the assignment for security was a choate lien according to principles
enunciated by the Court in United States v. City of New Britain.s8
As indicated, the amount of the account receivable was not known
at the time of tax lien filing. It was to be determined on the basis of
estimates of the quantity of dirt transported to the construction site and
subject to subsequent revision by an engineer's measurement. The Solic-
itor General analyzed whether or not the possible change by the engineer
in the amount owing on the assigned claim made the assignment "in-
choate." In concluding it did not, he stated:
87. 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam). The case involved an assignment by a subcontractor
of all its right to payments under a subcontract with Ball Construction. The assignment was
to the performance-bond surety as security for any payments the surety might have to make
owing to the subcontractor's default on the contract or for any other indebtedness that might
arise between the subcontractor and the surety. Later the subcontractor entered into another
contract, not involving Ball Construction and the surety executed a second performance bond
on April 4, 1953. By April 30, 1953 Ball owed the subcontractor $13,228.55. In May, June,
and September of 1953 the federal government filed notice of tax liens against the sub-
contractor. Subsequently the subcontractor defaulted on the second contract owing the
surety $12,971.88. The surety alleged that the assignment gave it the rights of a mortgagee
under then § 6323(a). This section states that a tax lien is not valid as against a mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor until notice of the tax lien is filed. The Supreme
Court in a per curiam decision which stated no facts or principles of law reversed the lower
court decisions and held the statute not applicable because the instrument involved was
inchoate and unperfected.
One of the basic problems with the Ball decision lies in the Court's neglect to explain the
basis upon which the surety's lien was held inchoate. Several reasons for the Court's decision
could be argued, see Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the
Federal Government against the Inchoate Lien, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 724, 734 (1965), and much
confusion resulted. See 4 A. Corbin, supra note 29, at § 903 (Supp. 1964). The Court
presented its own interpretation of the case in United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S.
84 (1964). The Court explained that the surety's lien was inchoate because the amount
of the lien was uncertain at the time the tax lien arose. Moreover, commentators generally
felt that the lien in Ball was inchoate because the amount of the lien was indefinite at the
time the tax lien was filed. See Burroughs, The Choate Lien Doctrine, 1963 Duke L.J. 449;
Clark, supra note 1, at 459.
88. 347 U.S. 81 (1954). The Court stated that "[tihe liens may also be perfected In
the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a choate lien-when the Identity of
the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established." Id,
at 84.
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Just as a mortgage on real estate is not made inchoate because the value of the
property ... is uncertain, so the petitioner's lien on the taxpayer's contractual right
to payment for work performed is not made inchoate because the amount payable on
the assigned right has not been finally ascertained. The requirement of definiteness of
amount goes only to the debt secured by the lien, not to the property (otherwise
specifically identified) that is subject to the lien.8s
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General's opinion that
the lien was choate and vacated the judgment." On remand, the court
of appeals (understandably reflecting some annoyance with the Govern-
ment's about face) 9 held that the assignment to Crest Finance was per-
fected under Illinois law without filing and was entitled to priority over
the later federal tax liens. On its facts, Crest Finance is a holding that
an assignment for security of an amount not determined as of the date
of tax lien filing meets the test of specificity of property required under
the choate lien doctrine where the amount represents payment for work
performed.
A similar case was Hammes v. Tucson Newspapers, Inc.0- There, a
taxpayer assigned as security certain installment payments to become
due under a contract for the sale of real property. While all the circum-
stances are not clear from the decision, the contract was apparently
executory and some additional performance was due from the taxpayer
(presumably the conveyance of the property in accordance with the con-
tract)-although no performance seemed required prior to the time that
the assigned installment in dispute came due. After the contract pay-
ments were assigned, a federal tax lien was filed against the assignor.
The assigned payment in dispute did not fall due until after filing of the
tax lien. In holding the assignment valid, the court indicated: "The fact
that the property subject to the lien is a present right to receive money
in futuro does not make the lien inchoate, at least where the right is
unconditional."93 Despite the court's language, the right to receive the
money was at least conditional on the passage of time. 4
89. Memorandum for the United States, supra note 67, at 6 (emphasis added).
90. 368 U.S. 347 (1961).
91. United States v. Crest Fin. Co., 302 F.2d 568, 569 (7th Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
The court stated that "[wie cannot change our position as readily as the Government has
done in this case, and we adhere to the position hereinbefore taken."
92. 324 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1963).
93. Id. at 103.
94. While discussing the question of the identity of the property subject to the lien, note
should be taken of the cases of United States v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 373 S.W.2d 333
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 380 S.W.2d 576 (Tea. Sup. Ct. 1964), and
Davis & Warshow, Inc. v. Iser, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 528, 220 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. CL 1961).
In the former case Seabreeze Pools entered into a contract with Paden on May 31, 1960 to
build a swimming pool On September 9, 1960 Seabreeze made an assignment of his contract
1969]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
Some writers, distinguishing Crest Finance, have indicated that prior
to the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 "the expected proceeds of an execu-
tory contract, which were yet to be earned by the taxpayer's performance,
were regarded as not 'in existence,' and a security interest therein was
deemed 'inchoate' and was subordinated to an intervening federal tax
lien."95 A careful review of the cases cited to support their view, however,
finds that they do not seem to stand indisputably for that proposition."
Furthermore, even if the cases did hold what they are cited for, they
could scarcely be regarded as conclusive in a field in which any pronounce-
ment below the level of the Supreme Court has been vulnerable to re-
right to Turner. At the time the assignment was made about 1/3 of the work was com-
pleted. Prior to September 9, 1960 the federal government filed a notice of tax lien against
Seabreeze. The federal government later filed notice of a second tax lien after September 9
with knowledge of the Turner assignment. The court held that the Turner assignment had
priority over the second tax lien. The court declared that the lien created by the assignment
was choate and perfected when Paden was notified of the assignment. Under Texas law
the assignor's contract right was "property" although it was contingent on completion of
the contract work.
In the latter case there was an assignment by a contractor to a materialman of money to
become due to the contractor from the city pursuant to a contract. The federal government
filed notice of a tax lien against the contractor subsequent to the materialman's notification
to the city of the assignment from the contractor. The government argued that because at
the time of the assignment the contract work had not been performed by the contractor
and accepted by the city there was nothing which the contractor could assign, and so the
assignment was of an inchoate interest. The government argued that the materialman's
interest had to be specific and choate at the time of the assignment in order to operate as a
transfer of legal title to the materialman and be superior to the federal tax lien. The court
rejected the government's argument stating that the assignment was choate unless it could
be shown that the parties did not intend a present and irrevocable transfer of the property
interest. See generally Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 601 (1961).
95. W. Plumb & L. Wright, supra note 8, at 93; see Coogan, supra note 8, at 1386.
96. See, e.g., Dean Constr. Co. v. Simonetta Concrete Constr. Corp., 65-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff 9253 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (The assignment in this case involved after acquired accounts
receivable not existing contract rights.); Jett Drilling Co. v. Tibbits, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
1 9540 (W.D. La. 1964) (Here the lien was held inchoate because the amounts assigned were
indefinite. The court does not state that the proceeds to be derived under an executory
contract are not in existence.) ; In re Hudon & Son, Inc., 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9517 (D. Mass.
1964) (The assignment in this case involved after acquired accounts receivable, not existing
contract rights.); Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Iowa 1961) (The court merely
held that the bank was not a mortgagee or pledgee. However, the decision is unclear.) The
cases of United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1960) and First State Bank
v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 204 (D. Minn. 1958), were also distinguished from Crest by
the Government in its memorandum. See Memorandum for the United States, supra note 67,
at 7-8 n.2. Professor Coogan in his article, supra note 8, at 1386, states that under pre-Act
law when a taxpayer performed a contract subsequent to tax lien filing, the right to future
payments so earned were held not to be the taxpayer's property at the time of filing-but
were after acquired collateral. However, no cases were cited for this proposition.
versal. 7 Only one of the cases went beyond the district court level,s and
all seem understandably to reflect confusion as to the meaning of United
States v. R. F. Ball Construction Co.,"0 which did not involve the question
of whether the property subject to the mortgage was sufficiently specific
to meet the choate lien test. The case cited by such writers, closest in
point' 0 decided that a bank was not a "mortgagee," "pledgee" or "pur-
chaser" for purposes of Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 6323 and,
in passing, mentioned that "[t]he assignment had to do with monies that
would become due in the future under an executory contract."' 01 It is not
clear to what extent, if at all, the decision was influenced by the fact that
future payments were involved. In any event, the quoted language de-
scribes the situation in Hammes'02 which, as indicated earlier, ruled
against the tax lien.
In addition, state law concerning secured transactions generally makes
it clear that payments to come due under an existing lease, charter or
other contract can serve as security for a loan and are not a species of
after-acquired property. The leading case, decided by a distinguished
court, is Rockmore v. Lehman. 0 3 In that case, Calvert was obligated
under contracts to pay fixed sums over a period of years for the fur-
nishing and maintenance of signs. The contracts were assigned as security
for loans.
The advances were not made upon a mere agreement to assign rights which might arise
in the future and did not exist at the time contracts were made, but upon assign-
ments of definite contractual obligations.' 0 4
We are convinced that the New York Court of Appeals has differentiated assignments
of existing contracts by way of pledge from agreements to assign rights that have not
yet come into being,' 0 5 even as interests contingent upon counter-performance.1 0o
[W]e hold that the date of the assignments governed the imposition of the liens
on any sums due from Calvert. This is because the contracts, and not the moneys
accruing under them, were the subjects of the assignments.'07
97. The cases reversed are listed in Kennedy, supra note 87, at 729 n23.
98. See cases cited note 96 supra.
99. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
100. Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
101. Id. at 341.
102. 324 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1963).
103. 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943). See also Restatement
of Contracts § 149(5) (1932) ; Restatement of Security § la (1941) ; 4 A. Corbin, supra note
29, at § 881.
104. 129 F.2d at 892.
105. Many times this distinction was not made in the cases or by the commentators
previously cited. See cases cited and text accompanying note 96 supra.
106. 129 F.2d at 892.
107. Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
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Rockmore v. Lehman is exceptionally good authority because of the
manner in which it arose. At the district court level the trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the assignor unsuccessfully opposed the assignments. 08 On
appeal to the second circuit, Judge Augustus Hand and Judge Frank
initially reversed on the ground that the assignment of contract rights
"constituted no more than promises to pay the assignees out of funds
to be created by the assignor's labor which could not withstand the
attack of the trustee in bankruptcy."' 09 Judge Clark, dissenting in a well
reasoned opinion, said:
I do not believe the decisions require so ancient a theory as that an assignment of
definite contract rights, future only in the sense that they are conditioned upon the
performance which the promisee has promised, is only a promise to pay out of future
funds, and not a present transfer. The New York cases cited.., are all distinguishable.
Some deal with after-acquired property; and some with future accounts receivable.
Such cases emphasize the distinction between assignment of rights under an already
existing contract and of rights to be created by promises in the future.11o
A motion for rehearing was made and Milbank, Tweed & Hope, Davis
Polk Wardwell Gardiner & Reed, Larkin, Rathbone & Perry, Shearman
& Sterling and White & Case, all of New York City, appeared as amici
curiae on the brief. The rehearing was granted; the earlier decision was
held erroneous and the decision of the district court was affirmed. Cer-
tiorari was denied by the Supreme Court."'
The law firms at the rehearing demonstrated to the court that in a
period of one week their clients had lent six hundred million dollars to
contractors doing war work. Security for the loans was limited to an
assignment of contract payments by the Government. These rights were
all contingent on future performance by the assignors. They also pointed
out that during the same week the bank lent over two billion dollars for
which the assignment of contract rights was the chief security. The vital
importance to the financial community of this type of security caused the
court to reverse and approve Judge Clark's dissent."2
Today, it could undoubtedly be demonstrated that hundreds of billions
of dollars have been invested on the security of future payments coming
due under existing leases, charters and other contracts. While in many
instances the lender may also have a mortgage on real or personal prop-
erty, this will not always be true." For the courts to conclude that such
108. See Rockmore v. Lehman, 128 F.2d 564, rev'd on rehearing, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
109. 128 F.2d at 567.
110. Id. (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
111. 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
112. See 4 A. Corbin, supra note 29, at § 903 (Supp. 1964).
113. Many times "corporate real estate obligations" are secured merely by an assignment
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security interests are "inchoate" could cause disaster in the financial
community.
Prior to passage of the Tax Lien Act, then Assistant Chief Counsel
Reiling of the Internal Revenue Service, while necessarily speaking in a
personal rather than an official capacity, made the following observations
concerning those writers who had suggested that an assignment of the
kind being considered would be "inchoate":
What also is disturbing, in current criticism, is the doubt that some attempt to cast
upon the priority of pledges or assignments of future wages and rents made prior to the
assertion of a tax lien. The doubt, so it is alleged, arises because of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the R. F. Ball Construction Company case; but I do not agree that
the decision in that case poses any such doubt.
When the tax lien arises, if, as was true in the Ball Construction case, there is no
debt or obligation to be secured by the pledge, obviously the nominal pledgee then has
no property right in the future income covered by the pledge instrument. That was
generally recognized long before this Supreme Court decision, for a pledge without a
debt or obligation to be secured by it really is not pledge. On the other hand, if the
pledge is made as security for an obligation which is definite at the time the tax lien
arises, the pledgee may easily show the extent of his interest in the future income.
In my opinion, the priority of the pledge is not affected by the fact that future
income is pledged, for future income may be fully assigned if the assignment is for
consideration, and it follows that an interest in such income may be assigned as
security for the satisfaction of a debt or obligation."14
The same conclusion with respect to assignments of rents was reached
by Clark C. Havighurst." 5
Furthermore, it appears that analytically the choate lien doctrine does
not require a different result. The Court has indicated that the property
subject to the competing lien must be specific as of the date of tax lien
filing.116 The property subject to the competing lien is the taxpayer's
interest in the assigned lease, charter or contract. That interest is in esse
at the time of the assignment. Part of that interest is the right to receive
future payments. That too, is a specific, existing right which is recog-
nized universally as a proper subject for a security interest.1 7 In the types
of transactions being considered, lenders advance substantial sums in
reliance on the effectiveness of such security interests. For the Court to
insist that the money involved must have been actually earned by the
taxpayer's performance or must have been unconditionally payable as of
of leases, and mortgages are not used as an additional form of security. See Letter from
Insurance Department to All Insurers Authorized to do Business in the State of New York,
Nov. 27, 1961, on file in New York State Insurance Department
114. Reiling, Priority of Federal Tax Liens, 36 Taxes 978, 983 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
115. Havighurst, supra note 8.
116. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 US. 81 (1954).
117. See 4 A. Corbin, supra note 29, at § 903 (1964 Supp.).
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the time of federal tax lien filing would be to add another, unnecessary
dimension to the choate lien doctrine. Such an addition would seem par-
ticularly inappropriate in light of congressional efforts in the 1966 Act
to harmonize tax lien law with modern financial practices. If, in a par-
ticular case, the factual situation would result in an abuse,118 the Court
can treat that specially. To fashion a broad rule, however, which would
invalidate or cast doubt on a widespread, desirable, and highly important
financing technique would be completely impractical and a tremendous
disservice to the financial community. Legislative relief with retroactive
effect would become imperative.
Again turning to some of the variations mentioned earlier,119 an assign-
ment should be valid as against the later federal tax lien whether it is an
assignment of an existing lease, charter or contract or of payments due
thereunder. As suggested above, 2 ° if the contract is in esse, the right to
future payments is also in esse,111 and this right may be effectively trans-
ferred outright or as security.'22 The fact that actual payment may be
conditional on some performance does not alter the fact that the right to
payment is specific, existing, intangible personal property,123 and that a
valid security interest can be created therein. Likewise, the other varia-
tions mentioned'24 should not alter the result if a valid security interest
has been created under applicable local law prior to tax lien filing.
It is concluded, therefore, that before passage of the Federal Tax Lien
Act of 1966, there had been no clear holding that an assignment for
security of an existing lease, charter or contract or payments due there-
under was inchoate merely because some payments, not yet earned by
118. An assignment of contract rights under certain circumstances might not protect the
creditor's position as well as it might be thought. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at §§ 41.1-
41.11 for a detailed description of the risks confronted by an assignee of contract rights.
However, the assignments discussed in this article assume that the assignee has taken certain
measures to protect his interest in the assigned contracts. For instance, many times the lender
requires that the borrower make covenants besides the repayment agreement. The most com-
mon one is that the borrower and high credit corporation agree not to amend or terminate
the lease or contract without the prior approval of the lender. The high credit corporation
might also agree to waive certain possible defenses so as to assure the lender of repayment of
the loan. Gustin, supra note 1, at 689-90, 695.
119. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Torkington v. Magee, (19021 2 K.B. 427, 430 where the court said that a
"'[c)hose in action' [contract right] is a known legal expression used to describe all
personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action .... "; Restate-
ment of Property, Introductory Note ch. 1 (1936).
124. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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performance or unconditionally payable, fell due after filing of a federal
tax lien. Furthermore, because such property or rights to property as-
signed for security are in esse, they are "specifically identified -"J2 for
purposes of the choate lien test. Finally, the fact that future payments
under an existing contract are not a species of after-acquired property
should conclusively settle the matter unless the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, to which we now turn, requires a different resulL
V. "IN ESSE" THEORY-POST FEDERAL TAX LnEN AcT
Prior to the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the Internal Revenue Code
contained virtually no provisions concerning the characteristics required
of competing liens.'- 6 Until the choate lien doctrine was fashioned, it was
generally assumed that competing liens would be recognized to the same
extent as under state law.117 As the doctrine grew and prospered, however,
the necessity for comprehensive legislative reform became clear. '
The general coverage of the new Act has been described elsewhere, and
repetition here is not necessary.2 Unfortunately, the particular problem
under consideration was not made the subject of a special provision.
However, the general provisions of the Act, together with the legislative
history, afford a reasonably clear picture of congressional intent.
First, it is clear that the Act was not intended to affect the "threshhold"
requirement that the property subject to the federal tax lien belong to
the taxpayer. 30 Therefore, the analysis previously made with respect to
the property assigned in our assumed factual situation 3' not being
"property" of the taxpayer is still applicable under the new law. 32
If for any reason payments due under an existing lease, charter or
other contract assigned as security are held to be property of the assignor-
taxpayer to which a federal lien will attach, the starting point in deter-
mining the relative priority of the assignment as against a subsequent
federal tax lien is Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 6323 (a)."3 That
125. See Memorandum for the United States, supra note 67, at 6.
126. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323, as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323
(1966).
127. See ABA Final Report of the Comm. on Federal Liens (1959).
128. Id.
129. E.g., Creedon, The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966--An Historic Breakthrough, 4
Harv. J. Legis. 163 (1967); Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. Law. 271 (1967).
130. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
131. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 28-72 supra.
133. "(a) Purchases [purchasers], Holders of Security Interests, blechanic's Lienors, and
judgment Lien Creditors.-The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against
any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor
19691 TAX LIENS
562 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
subsection makes it clear that the "holder of [a] security interest" is
entitled to priority over a subsequently filed federal tax lien against the
taxpayer. 34 The key to the resolution of the problem, however, is the
definition of security interest, which appears in paragraph 1 of subsec-
tion (h) :
Definitions.-For purposes of this section and section 6324-
(1) Security interest.-The term "security interest" means any interest in property
acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an
obligation or indemnifying against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any
time (A) if, at such time, the property is in existence and the interest has become
protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an un-
secured obligation, and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder has parted with
money or money's worth.135
The first element of the definition requiring consideration is the phrase
"any interest in property." These all-inclusive words'30 undoubtedly in-
clude the interest of a taxpayer in a lease, charter or contract and pay-
ments to come due thereunder. It is, of course, necessary to distinguish
between a contract which does not necessarily create a property interest
in the subject matter of the contract and a contract which is itself in-
tangible personal property. Rights under an existing executory contract
are clearly assignable as security for a loan. 13 7 Therefore, the assignment
in our assumed facts' 38 constitutes a "security interest" under Code sec-
tion 6323 (h) (1).
For our security interest to prevail over a subsequent federal tax lien,
it must "exist" within the meaning of subsection (h) (1) at the time
notice of the tax lien is filed. 30 This leads to the next and most critical
element of the definition. The security interest "exists" at the time "the
property is in existence." What do these words mean and how do they
apply to an assignment for security?
While the words "property is in existence" are used, obviously their
literal meaning could not have been intended. For example, in the case of
unimproved land, the property has presumably been "in existence" since
until notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the
Secretary or his delegate."
134. A literal reading of the section might lead one to believe that the tax lien acquires
validity as against the enumerated category of persons having earlier interests or liens once
it is properly filed. But the literal reading does not reflect the intent as evidenced by United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), and by the committee reports. See H.R.
Rep. No. 1884, supra note 75, at 3, 35.
135. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323 (h) (1).
136. Black's Law Dictionary 950 (4th ed. 1951).
137. 4 A. Corbin, supra note 29, at § 874.
138. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
139. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h) (1).
our planet was formed. The purpose of the language was obviously to
exclude "after acquired property" until it had in fact been acquired.
Thus, if a security interest purported to cover all contract rights and
accounts receivable "now owned or hereafter acquired by a debtor," a
security interest would exist under section 6323 (h) (1) in those contract
rights and accounts receivable then owned by the debtor but no security
would exist in those to be acquired in the future until they were in fact
acquired. As was made abundantly clear in Rockmore v. Lelhman,4 °
the assignment of rights under an existing contract is not an assignment
of after acquired property. The rights are presently existing and can be
presently transferred and encumbered. 41 That a security interest exists
in these rights from the time they are assigned would seem to be beyond
dispute. It should not be necessary to determine that a security interest
also exists in the payments themselves that are to fall due after tax lien
filing. These payments are incidents of the assigned lease, charter, con-
tract or right and necessarily follow the instrument or right to which they
relate.' However, there is good authority for the proposition that a
security interest should be recognized as existing even in the payments
themselves.1'4
There is supporting legislative history, if any is needed, for the inter-
pretation just urged. For example, it is clear from more than one source144
that contract rights are a species of property envisioned as being a proper
subject of a security interest under the Act. While the specific discussion
of contract rights in the legislative history relates to subsection (c) of
section 6323,115 it should be stressed that the recognition of security
interests in contract rights as qualifying for the "superpriority" provided
by subsection (c) necessarily involves recognition that they qualify for
the normal priority of subsections (a) and (h) (1). Contract rights, by
definition under the U.C.C., are rights to payment under a contract "not
yet earned by performance."' 4 Thus, Congress necessarily embraced the
140. 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
141. 4 A. Corbin, supra note 29, at § 903 (Supp. 1964).
142. 6 C.JS. Assignments § 85 (1937). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the pay-
ments from security interests in personal property are characterized as "proceeds," which is
"whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold." Uniform Commercial Code § 9-306.
143. See Coogan, supra note 8, at 1385.
144. H.R. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 75, at 42; Statement by Hon. Stanley S. Surrey,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 38 (1966).
145. The sub-section provides in general that even though notice of a lien imposed by
§ 6321 has been properly filed the lien will be invalid as against enumerated types of security
interests which come into existence within 45 days after tax lien filing.
146. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-106.
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concept that rights to payments not yet earned by performance arising
under existing assigned contracts are in esse and such a security interest
will prevail over a later federal tax lien. Any other interpretation would
necessarily involve a rejection of the idea that contract rights are a
proper subject for a security interest because, if the payment under the
contract had to be unconditionally payable or earned by performance, we
would no longer be dealing with contract rights. It might be argued that
contract rights can be valid security only under section 6323(c) (2) (C)
if payment under the contract becomes payable within 45 days of tax
lien filing. However, this argument basically rejects contract rights as a
species of property in which a security interest can "exist," because once
a payment has been earned, it is an account payable.
The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Stanley S. Surrey, under
whose jurisdiction much of the drafting of the legislation took place,
specifically indicated in his testimony before the House Ways and Means
Committee that contract rights were an envisioned kind of security.147
He also mentioned that chattel paper, notes, instruments and mortgages
were envisioned subjects of security. Some of these are specifically
mentioned in part of the Act. 48 Chattel paper as defined in the U.C.C.
includes "a lease of specific goods ."49 All of the species of property men-
tioned necessarily involve payments coming due in futuro. In some of
them, the amount of the payments will be fixed and unconditional. In
others, such as a chattel paper involving a lease of specific goods, the
payments will be conditioned on performance. Here then is further evi-
dence of legislative intent.
The technical explanation of the Act contained in the Report of the
Committee on Ways and Means reads in part as follows:
Commercial financing security defined.-Subparagraph (C) of section 6323(c)(2)
provides that, for purposes of section 6323(c), the term "commercial financing
security" means (i) paper of a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions,
(ii) accounts receivable, (iii) mortgages on real property, and (iv) inventory. In
general, paper of a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions includes any
written document customarily used in commercial transactions. For example, the term
includes paper giving contract rights (as defined in art. 9-106 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code); chattel paper (as defined in art. 9-105(b) of the Uniform Commercial
Code); documents (as defined in art. 9-105(e) of the Uniform Commercial Code),
such as documents of title to personal property; and, instruments (as defined in art.
9-105(g) of the Uniform Commercial Code), such as negotiable instruments or securi-
ties. It does not include general intangibles (for example, patents or copyrights), as
such intangibles are defined in article 9-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In-
ventory which is commercial financing security includes raw materials and goods in
147. Surrey, supra note 144, at 38.
148. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c) (2) (C).
149. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-105(1)(b).
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process as well as property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business.1' 0
Several important observations should be made about this explanation.
Note how carefully certain definitions are spelled out in detail, while
others are made by reference to the U.C.C. Particular attention to the
scheme followed is required of U.C.C. experts who may otherwise tend
to assume that the Act was intended to conform to the U.C.C. to a greater
degree than is the fact. For example, the familiar term "security interest"
which to the U.C.C. expert means an interest in personal property, under
the Act embraces an interest in any property. Similarly, the words quoted
above "paper of a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions"
may have a certain meaning in the typical U.C.C. context. The Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, however, (in a paragraph in which it other-
wise incorporates U.C.C. definitions) very clearly and purposefully de-
fined "paper of a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions" to
include any written document customarily used in commercial transac-
tions. Moreover, the Committee then enumerated certain kinds of paper,
including contract rights, that were included and certain kinds (general
intangibles) that were excluded. Again, the Committee quite carefully
defined "contract rights" by reference to the U.C.C., which are rights
"unearned by performance." It did the same with "chattel paper."
Thus, the Act obviously recognizes as property that may be the subject
of a security interest various kinds of property involving future payments,
unearned by performance. It is perhaps worth repeating that this recog-
nition, while appearing specifically in connection with the relatively
narrow term "commercial financing security" in section 6323(c) (2) (C),
necessarily carries over to section 6323(h) (1), where the broader term
"any interest in property" obviously must include any interest in specific
kinds of property embraced within the narrower definition of "commer-
cial financing security."
As suggested earlier, the fact that the Act contemplates security in-
terests in property of a kind that necessarily involves payments in the
future strongly supports the interpretation urged above that such prop-
erty is "in existence" and that a security interest "exists" even though
payments under the assigned lease, charter or contract fall due after tax
lien filing. It would seem very unrealistic to interpret the Act to require
that future payments coming due under some or all property, such as
contract rights, chattel paper, including leases of personal property, mort-
gages, notes, leases of real property and other long-recognized similar
forms of security, would only be valid security if the payments became
150. HR. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 75, at 42 (emphasis added).
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payable within 45 days after tax lien filing-especially in situations (such
as our assumed factual situation) in which advances are not made peri-
odically. Such an interpretation would, for all practical purposes, nullify
such security as against later federal tax liens.
Some writers have suggested that future payments under a lease of
tangible personal property might be treated differently under the Act
from future payments under a lease of real property because only the
former are mentioned in the House Report.iei Again, it must be realized
that the personal property leases are mentioned solely in connection with
the subsection (c) (2) (C) definition of "commercial financing security"
which deals primarily with an exception to the requirement in subsection
(h) (1) that "the holder has parted with money" as of the date of tax lien
filing. It would seem illogical to reason that because leases of chattels are
valid security under subsection (c) (2) (C), that is an indication that
future payments under such leases are valid under subsection (h) (1) but
that future payments under other instruments are not valid. It can be
reasoned more persuasively that the fact that future payments are recog-
nized under subsection (c) (2) (C) is an indication that the "property in
existence" requirement of subsection (h) (1) is met in the case of a
security interest in an existing lease, charter or contract involving future
payments.
Suppose, for example, there were no subsection (c) (2) (C). Assume
further that the House Report otherwise reflected an interest in expanding
the classes protected under section 6323 (a) to include the usual kinds of
U.C.C. interests. The phrase "any interest in property" would suffice for
such purpose. Clearly "chattel paper" is an interest in property. Clearly
it involves future payments. If there were any intent to exclude future
payments, would not some express language for that purpose have been
included in subsection (h) (1)? No such language was included. The
requirement that the property be "in existence" is not adequate because
the chattel paper is "in existence." Furthermore, because of the nature
of U.C.C. financing, Congress concluded that certain types of U.C.C.
transactions should be protected even as against earlier federal tax liens.
This protection was limited to situations in which the loan was made or
the security interest in the property was acquired within 45 days after
tax lien filing. 52 In addition, the protection was limited to security inter-
ests in only certain kinds of property, not simply any interest in property.
Here, it was necessary to mention the kinds of property entitled to this
"superpriority." Chattel paper, contract rights and other property in-
volving future payments are clearly intended to be protected. Would
151. W. Plumb & L. Wright, supra note 8, at 95.
152. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c)(2).
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Congress be giving these interests a "superpriority" if they were not
already protected under subsection (h) (1) for a normal priority? Clearly
not. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that subsection (h) (1) has no
requirement that would prevent leases, charters and contracts involving
future payments from constituting valid, existing security. Mr. Surrey,
referring to the 45 day "superpriority," recognized that chattel paper,
contract rights, and other forms of commercial financing security in-
volving future payments would be entitled to first in time, first in right
priority when he stated: "If notice [of the tax lien] has not been filed
[when the loan is made] they will, of course, be protected as security in-
terests against the unfiled Federal lien."113
Finally, it is appropriate to examine to what extent the Federal Tax
Lien Act was intended to supersede the "choate" lien doctrine as far as
assignments for security are concerned. As mentioned earlier,'" the
House Report states:
Under decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee, or judgment creditor is
protected at the time notice of the tax lien is filed if the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are all established at such
time .... Except as otherwise provided, subsection (a) of new section 6323 retains
this basic rule of Federal law.ras
The major inquiry, then, is to what extent does the Act "otherwise pro-
vide." It is submitted that as far as security interests are concerned the
Act was intended to supersede completely the choate lien doctrine. For
ten years, groups of lawyers worked on developing a set of specific pro-
visions relating to security interests that would override the choate lien
doctrine-carefully balancing the interests of the federal government and
private creditors. This is not to say that many of the elements of the
choate lien doctrine were not written into the Act so as to protect the
federal lien. It is to say, however, that the Act was drafted in response to
the Supreme Court's invitation to legislate in the field and that the
statute, and not the long line of cases that the statute was intended to
replace, is now the sole arbiter of the relative priority of federal liens
and security interests.
If this is true, then what is the meaning of the phrase quoted from
the House Report? To some extent nonstatutory case law may continue
to govern the "judgment lien creditor" mentioned in section 6323 (c). The
choate lien doctrine will also presumably continue to apply to garnish-
ments, attachments, landlords' liens, state and local liens of some kinds
and other statutory liens. While these interests are not mentioned in
153. Surrey, supra note 144, at 38.
154. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
155. H.R. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 75, at 35 (citation omitted).
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section 6323 (a), the intent is clear that the choate lien doctrine continues
to govern them. But as to purchasers and security interests the detailed
provisions of section 6323 are necessarily intended to control.
Thus, in determining the question under consideration, the governing
provision is subsection (h) (1) and its definition of security interest.
Nothing in that subsection suggests that a security interest in an existing
lease, charter or contract involving future payments is not a valid security
interest as against a later federal tax lien. Rather as suggested above, the
evidence is all the other way.
Unfortunately, the first case under the Act involving one aspect of this
problem failed to analyze the question along the lines suggested. In
Continental Finance, Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co.,150 Centre, a
trucking firm, entered into a security agreement with Continental Finance
on December 19, 1962, under which Centre assigned certain property to
Continental as security for loans to be made. Continental made the loans
pursuant to such agreement prior to tax lien filing against Centre on
February 10, 1964. A dispute arose between Continental and the United
States with respect to their relative priority to money owing by Cam-
bridge Lee Metal Company under a contract dated October 17, 1962
between Cambridge and Centre. The parties stipulated in the action that
prior to the tax lien filing on February 10, 1964, Continental had a
perfected security interest in Centre's contract rights under the executory
contract with Cambridge. After tax lien filing, Centre performed work
for Cambridge which caused Cambridge to owe $10,812 under the con-
tract, an amount less than the amount owing by Centre to Continental
as of the date of tax lien filing.
In its brief the Government's argument was based completely on the
statutory provisions prior to the 1966 Act. 5 7 Presumably, it was prepared
and submitted before the 1966 Act was passed. The decision was handed
down, however, on April 5, 1968, and reflected an awareness of the new
Act.15 8 After setting forth in full certain relevant portions of new section
6323, instead of analyzing the new provisions to determine whether or
not contract rights were intended to be a proper subject for a security
interest under the Act, the court went off on what seems to be a pre-1966
tangent, saying:
156. 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853 (L. Div. 1968).
157. Brief for Government at 6-9, Continental Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co.,
100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853 (L. Div. 1968). A copy of the government's brief was
obtained by the author through the attorneys for Continental Finance.
158. See Continental Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 332-34,
241 A.2d 853, 855-57 (L. Div. 1968).
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[B]efore the rule [first in time, first in right] is applied the state created lien must be
specific and perfected in the federal sense ...
... A competing state-created lien has no protection against a recorded Federal Tax
Lien until it becomes choate in the federal sense.1 9
The court then returned to analyze section 6323(c), which was not
applicable because the loan by Continental to Centre was made and the
contract rights were assigned prior to tax lien filing. If Continental was
entitled to priority over the federal tax lien, it would have been entitled
on the facts to priority under section 6323 (a) and subsection (h) (1) not
section 6323 (c). In any event, the court again returned to the choate
lien doctrine, and the three way specificity requirement of identity of
the lien or, amount of the lien, and property subject to the lien.YO It con-
cluded, because the proceeds of the assigned contract were earned after
the date of tax lien filing, the lien was inchoate.
Next the court emphasized that the 1966 Act reaffirmed the choate lien
test because it requires that property be "in existence" at the time of
tax lien filing. It rejected the argument that the contract rights rather
than the proceeds were the security and that the contract rights were in
existence and assigned long before tax lien filing. Again, its reasoning was
that the lien was not "choate," citing a host of pre-1966 Act cases.
What the court has concluded is that contract rights cannot be the sub-
ject of an effective security interest under present law. To require that the
payment be earned at the time of tax lien filing is to require that the
security interest exist in an account receivable. The court's conclusion
is reached in the face of extensive evidence in the legislative history of
the 1966 Act that the Act was intended to bring tax lien law closer in
line with commercial practices. 1 1 While it is perhaps possible (though
in the writer's opinion incorrect) to reach this conclusion on the particular
facts of Continental Finance (because contract payments did not have to
be paid over to the lender, and no fixed payments were called for), such
conclusion should be reached on the basis of an analysis of section
6323 (a) and subsection (h) (1) and its legislative history and not on the
basis of the now time-worn choate lien doctrine.
Admittedly, after more than fifteen years of having to contend with
the choate lien doctrine, it is not easy to abandon it and contend solely
with interpretation of the 1966 Act. And the court may have relied on
the general statement of the House Report0 2 that "except as otherwise
159. Id. at 335-36, 241 A2d at 857-58 (cting pre-1966 cases).
160. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954).
161. See generally House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative
History of H.R. 11256, Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.
162. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
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provided" the three-way test of the choate lien doctrine continues to
apply under section 6323 (a). As suggested, however, it is otherwise pro-
vided as to "security interests."
The court in Continental Finance1 3 distinguished In re Halprin0 4 on
the ground that in Halprin, the account debtor had agreed to pay the
finance company directly, whereas in Continental no such agreement was
made. While such a distinction is possible, a contrary result would be
supported by Bess, Aquilino, Durham Lumber and the no property doc-
trineY.0
5
In summary, it is believed that future payments under an existing lease,
charter or contract effectively assigned as security prior to tax lien filing
can and should be regarded under present law as not being "property"
of the assignor-taxpayer to which a tax lien against him will attach. If
for some reason it does attach, an earlier security interest should be
regarded as existing in property in esse and thus should be entitled to
priority over a later federal tax lien. 16
VI. PURCHASE MONEY PIORITY
In the facts assumed thus far, the loan by L was fully advanced prior
to the time notice of a tax lien was filed against B.10 7 In some circum-
stances, however, it is possible that part or all of L's advances will have
been made after the date of tax lien filing. Subsections (c) and (d) of
section 6323 afford limited protection to L as to future advances if the
security interest meets the tests set forth therein. "8 Even if L is not so
protected, he may find protection under the umbrella of the purchase
money priority doctrine.60 The U.C.C. affords special recognition to
various kinds of purchase money interests. 70
The Report of the Committee on Ways and Means on the 1966 Act
recognizes the fairness of the purchase money doctrine and affirmatively
indicates that the Act is not intended to affect its traditional applica-
163. 100 N.J. Super. at 338, 241 A.2d at 859.
164. 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960).
165. See text accompanying notes 28-72 supra.
166. It should be noted that under our assumed facts, see text accompanying note 5 supra,
the entire loan was made prior to tax lien filing. The 1966 Act does provide in § 6323(c) (d)
for limited protection in the case of advances made after tax lien filing.
167. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
168. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c) (d). For a discussion of this section see Coogan,
supra note 8, at 1394-1412; Creedon, Impact on Life Companies of the Federal Tax Lien Act
of 1966, at 29-39 (Paper presented to The Association of Life Insurance Counsel, May 8,
1967); W. Plumb & L. Wright, supra note 8, at 69-110.
169. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at §§ 28.1-29.5.
170. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 9-107, 9-312.
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tion.1 71 Since passage of the Act, the Internal Revenue Service has issued
a ruling affirming an intention to recognize the doctrine in enforcing and
asserting federal tax liens. 2
The scope of the purchase money doctrine has never been completely
clear. A liberal approach to its application offers the enforcement and
judicial authorities an opportunity to favor competing creditors in circum-
stances in which loans from the creditors prime the pump that produces
the flow of funds under the lease, charter or contract. As indicated earlier,
in many situations, the loan from L is used to build the building or the
ship or the pipeline or the other property which gives rise to the rents or
payments assigned.173 In such cases, it will frequently be equitable to
permit recovery of the loan prior to assertion of the federal tax lien.
Congressional recognition of the purchase money doctrine evidences a
willingness to have it applied so as to afford relief from the relatively
onerous requirements otherwise applicable under federal law to competing
liens.
Illustrative of how a benevolent court can take a broad view of the
purchase money doctrine is the case of In re Halprin 74 There, Commer-
cial made advances to taxpayer Halprin after notice of the tax lien was
filed. The advances were made to supply Halprin with funds "to meet
current payrolls." 75 In holding an assignment for security to be entitled
to priority over an earlier filed federal tax lien, the court said:
It is fair that this distinction [that contract payments were not property of the
taxpayer] be utilized to protect persons in the position of Commercial here. It is
eminently appropriate that one who finances property-producing transactions be able
to look for security to the acquisitions he is making possible. This justifies the
common law rule enabling a purchase-money mortgagee, even one with notice, to
prevail over the holder of a prior security interest claiming under an after-acquired
property clause.... The financing of the performance of a manufacturing contract
such as we have here is a transaction essentially similar to a purchase-money mortgage;
in a real sense, the debt now owed by Doniger was created by funds furnished by
Commercial....
From a somewhat different approach, such a lender as Commercial has enriched the
taxpayer's estate by the amount loaned to the taxpayer. For this reason, it is not
unreasonable to allow it a corresponding security interest in the fruit of the borrowed
money, with the government relegated to the borrowing taxpayer's net after the lender
is reimbursed. The government has suffered no diminution of the assets which were
available to satisfy its tax claim before the loan. In addition, if the tax collector should
seize the borrowed funds before their expenditure he could do so.Y"'
171. H.R. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 75, at 4.
172. Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 553.
173. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
174. 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960).
175. Id. at 408.
176. Id. at 410.
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Similar views by other courts would go far toward eliminating the
bitter taste remaining from the strict and sometimes blind application
of the choate lien doctrine.
VII. CONCLUSION
Of course, the best way to avoid problems with federal tax liens is to
make loans only to borrowers who pay all their federal taxes. To the
extent feasible, therefore, lenders will often be advised to try to structure
their transactions so there is reasonable assurance that the borrower's
federal taxes will be paid."'
Similarly, to the extent practicable, lenders may arrange transactions
so as to make them least vulnerable to possible attack by later federal
tax liens. 178 In the final analysis, however, the burden is now on the courts
to implement the spirit and intent of the Tax Lien Act of 1966 to bring
federal tax lien law closer in line with financial practice. In the words
of one court:
[A] federal tax lien tends to defeat its ultimate purpose if it impedes the effective
assignment of future earnings as security for funds needed to make such earnings
possible. The result of such extension of the tax collector's reach is likely to be the
destruction of the earning power, and with it the taxpaying power of the burdened
business.' 7 9
177. Preferably the high credit corporation should be obliged to pay the borrower's taxes
as additional rent or in the form of a contract payment. However, such assurances cannot
always be obtained. If the borrower possesses no assets or income save the rental or contract
payments owing from the high credit corporation, the immediate threat of a tax lien is
minimal because the borrower's income from rents or the contract would, for the most part,
be offset at the beginning by its deductions for interest and accelerated depreciation allow-
ances. Moreover, this type of financing greatly relies upon the allowance for depreciation
because such benefit provides the borrower with the tax-free funds which enable it to repay
the loan. See Gustin, supra note 1, at 698.
178. See Havighurst, supra note 8, at 953.
179. In re Halprin, 280 F.2d at 410 (3d Cir. 1960).
